Indigenous Air Defence Systems

Air defence is needed for the protection of naval vessels, moving or stationary army units, air force bases and all strategic installations and infrastructure. Air defence units may be based on ground (Surface to Air missile (SAM)) or airborne (air force fighter jets). Both types of units need radars for target detection and tracking. For ballistic missile defence, the radar may even be located in space. Radars are also needed for space surveillance (against spy satellites) like the GRAVES radar of France but the scope here is limited to aerial surveillance only. For those who do not know, radar works in air and space whereas sonar is used underwater (as used by ships and submarines) for surveillance. Surface to Air missiles are mostly conventional weapons although nuclear versions (e.g., Nike Hercules) were also made during the Cold war by super powers.

In order to engage a target or an airspace intruder (aircraft or ballistic/cruise missile), it must first be located and this is the job of surveillance radar. For low-level intrusions, low-level radars are needed if they are on ground. In general, low-level radars have short range and medium-to-high-level radars have long range. A good example of long-range surveillance radar network would be the Canadian NORAD system for providing early warning of Soviet Union's nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles. The low-level shortcoming of the ground-based long-range surveillance radar (due to Earth's Curvature) has been overcome by airborne radars. Once an intruder is located, it is passed on to the nearest tracking radar of a SAM system or the information is relayed to the air force fighters and they pick up the target on their own airborne radars.

Modern air intercept missiles (air-to-air or surface-to-air) carry their own radar like AMRAAM, Derby, MICA-RF, AA-12 Adder etc and they are called as active radar-guided missiles. Earlier mechanical-scanning tracking radars could handle one target at a time if the missile was also semi-active (without its own radar). Modern electronic-scanning radars can handle multiple targets simultaneously especially if they are used with active radar-guided or infra-red/imaging infra-red (IR/IIR) missiles. This is one of the reasons that instead of designing dedicated SAMs, the active radar and IR/IIR air-to-air missiles are also employed as SAMs (AMRAAM, MICA-Vertical Launch, Derby, Python, IRIS-T). This latest configuration of SAM systems is effective against aircrafts using decoys to saturate defences.

Only few countries around the globe design and manufacture air defence radars and missiles. They include USA, Russia, Sweden, China, France, Italy, Germany (Rheinmetall) and Israel. Now India has also joined the list of these independent countries. India has made good progress in designing and manufacturing surveillance and tracking radars (The 3D Rajendra radar, see *1). United Kingdom had made some good long and short-range air defence systems in 1960s and 1970s (like Bloodhound, Thunderbird, Sea Wolf, Rapier) but new systems have not been introduced (except the MANPADS). If these select-club manufacturers of air defence systems make an agreement among themselves to leave some deliberate loopholes in the systems intended for export, then the theoretical lethality of these systems can be reduced in practice by someone knowing the loopholes.

The air defence industry has undergone a complete metamorphosis since the end of Cold War or the end of the Gulf war. During the first Gulf war, some Allied fighter jets were shot down by Rolland SAM system operated by Iraq. Rolland is a Franco-German SAM that can change its guidance technique during an engagment. Since these instances, the SAM industry in Europe and elsewhere has seen a lot of re-arrangment and re-organization like the disappearance of Euromissile, Aérospatiale, Thomson-CSF and Matra and takeover by MBDA,Thales etc. When it comes to the business of air defence systems, a pattern is evident (which is based on national defence requirements and customer's demand). Israel does not market a man-portable air defence system (MANPADS). France, Germany, Italy and Sweden do not sell long-range SAMs. Only Russia and China market the long-range SAMs. The deployment of US Patriot SAM is usually for political reasons in defence of an ally. Additionally, USA has not sold the THAAD or other missiles meant for ballistic missile defence (see *2).

It has become vital to have indigenous radars for airspace surveillance. A first step can be taken by introducing indigenous surveillance radars of medium-range against airborne targets and long-range radars against ballistic missiles. Defence against ballistic missiles requires long-range surveillance radars (Like the Green Pine radar acquired by India from Israel). Surveillance or search radar does not need to be part of SAM systems, although they are inter-connected. So an indigenous search radar can be used in conjunction with an imported air defence system.

Surveillance radars can also be used nation-wide on country's civilian airports for active control of air traffic. The recent crash of PIA ATR-42 aircraft shows that primary radars are needed on all airports. Civil aviation relies on the aircraft's transponder to locate its position etc which is not a reliable method. A transponder can be switched off, can stop working due to discharged battery and no power from engine or it can also develop a fault. In such cases, the aircraft would simply disappear from the screen of the air traffic controller. With primary radars of proper tuning, the civilian air traffic controllers would also be able to see the military air traffic and the civil-military air traffic coordination would improve.

Pakistan has had multiple conflicts with its neighbours and has fought several declared and shadow wars with them but strangely never considered developing its own air defence radars and missiles. The shoulder-launched Anza series MANPAD system has very limited effectiveness and range. What is needed is a complete indigenous mobile system with short and medium-range missiles, search radar, tracking radar, IFF (Identification of Friend and Foe) and networking among various batteries/units. With mobile units, it is possible to change the deployment configuration of missile launchers and radars according to terrain and type of threat.

If there had been active surveillance radars on the India-Pakistan Rann of Kutch border, the loss of Pakistan Navy Atlantique aircraft could have been averted (1999). Atlantique was an ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) aircraft and was shot-down by Indian Air Force for a possible airspace violation. This gap in radar-coverage has been bridged to some extent with the acquisition of balloon-mounted radars (both by India and Pakistan). The induction of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platforms should further improve the situation. Pakistan purchased two different AEW platforms, Saab Erieye from Sweden and Chinese AEW with a latent supposition that if one fails them, then the other might work. Lets hope that the strategic intelligence and other defence-related agencies of Pakistan have done their proper analyses before choosing this path.

*1 3D radar is capable of providing the three basic data streams of a detected aircraft, i.e., bearing, range and height. Early radars were 2D and a separate height-finding radar was needed for height or altitude information of the detected aircraft. Among other data of a detected aircraft are its speed, heading, closure rate (for airborne radars) and identification.

*2 It is interesting to note that countries under the US nuclear umbrella like Australia, Canada,Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden etc did not get the missiles for ballistic missile defence like THAAD or SPRINT. What they received were either nuclear bombs or ballistic missiles stationed on their soil. Bombs can be used for a first pre-emptive or a second retaliatory strike but not for defence against a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile attack. An anti-missile missile like THAAD would destroy the incoming nuclear ballistic missile in space, before it reaches its target. Perhaps it was due to differences like these that France did not accept US nuclear umbrella and went ahead with its own program.