On 4th February 2005, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan appeared on television and took the entire responsibility of nuclear proliferation activities upon himself. The world media protrayed him like a terror trader and he was held responsible for nuclear proliferation activities (to Iran, Libya, North Korea and offers to Iraq and Syria [1]).
Numerous articles, books and documentaries (e.g.[5]) appeared on the activities of A.Q.Khan and his network. His confession added more confusion to the issue. He was repeatedly accused of stealing documents from his firm (Urenco) in the Netherlands, using them to manufacture nuclear weapons for Pakistan and then selling it to other countries.
In reality, Urenco had nothing to do with nuclear weapons. The firm Urenco worked in the civilian domain and made Lightly-Enriched Uranium (LEU) for civil nuclear power plants. A.Q.Khan did not work on nuclear weapons and not even on Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) during his stay in Netherlands. It is HEU that is needed for the nuclear bomb. LEU is used as fuel in light-water nuclear reactors for the generation of electricity. Therefore, even if some documents were copied from this firm, these were not enough to make HEU. LEU and HEU are two worlds apart.
In all cases of proliferation, A.Q.Khan only sold the technology of gas centrifuges (of making Lightly-Enriched Uranium) and some drawings of a chinese-origin implosion type nuclear bomb [2,5]. These drawings were found to be lacking in "crucial details" [2]. The HEU is the fissile material (or the explosive) that is used in making the nuclear weapons (bombs, missile and torpedo warheads, mines etc). There are many other elements needed for making a nuclear weapon. Knowing that Pakistan had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), three important questions that have not been addressed by eastern and western analysts/writers are:
1- Why A.Q.Khan did not sell ready-to-use nuclear bombs?
2- Why A.Q.Khan did not sell Highly-Enriched Uranium when he had already mastered this technology?
3- Why A.Q.Khan did not sell complete engineering drawings of a nuclear weapon?
If someone needs a car, he does not buy the whole car manufacturing plant. Similarly, if Libya needed a few atomic bombs, why would it pay hundred million dollars [1] for an entire plant which would only manufacture the explosive part of the bomb?
If Pakistan was not willing to sell ready-to-use bombs, why did the Libya not buy HEU and concentrate on making a bomb out of it? HEU is just one step toward making the weapon and every buyer does not need to do it for himself. It would be logical to purchase the HEU and then focus on pefecting the weapon design. In Europe, every country using civilian nuclear power plants does not produce its own enriched Uranium. Lightly-Enriched Uranium is produced by a consortium (like Urenco) for several countries together.
The same scenario applies to Iran. Iran took all the trouble and international sanctions just for Uranium Enrichment. According to [1,5], the centrifuges discovered in Iran were apparently the early Urenco-models, used by Pakistan. Even the offer to Iraq in 1990 was only for supply of centrifuges [1], which did not materialize due to the Gulf war.
Gas centrifuges in themselves are not strictly for military use. They can be used to produce Lightly-Enriched Uranium (LEU) for use in civil nuclear power plants for generation of electricity. Furthermore if the seller is an NSG member, LEU can be sold to all those countries that use light-water nuclear reactor power plants.
It is clear from above that Pakistan can only be blamed for the proliferation of peaceful and civilian nuclear technology. The reference [2] states that USA spent more than one hundred million dollars in Pakistan to improve the security of its nuclear installations. This means that the confession of A.Q.Khan was beneficial to Pakistan by one hundred million dollars.
Another aspect of this proliferation episode that has not been discussed is related to Pakistan's alliances. Pakistan can't afford to militarily stregthen the opponents of its own allies. Being a close ally of USA and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan could never ever provide nuclear arms technology to Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. But Pakistan is also a close ally of China and knowing the relations of China with other countries is important for Pakistani officials.
What really brought the downfall of A.Q.Khan? Most probably it was his co-operation with North-Korea in exchange for missile technology [1,5], even if it was just for the same civil-grade enrichment centrifuges only. Had A.Q.Khan been an avid reader of military history, he would have avoided it. The relations of Korea with China and Japan are of a special nature. In the past, both China and Japan have claimed suzerainty over Korea and both countries fought a bloody war on this same issue in 1894 [3]. In that war, Japan succeeded in expelling Chinese troops out of Korea.
Then came the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (also called World War Zero), in which the Imperial Japanese forces fought and defeated the Imperial Russian Forces which had threatened to occupy Manchuria and Korea [4]. Japan remained master of Korea, Manuchria and parts of China till the end of the Second World War (1939-1945).
After the defeat of Japan in 1945, China gained supremacy over Korea after a brief Russian occupation. The Korean War (1950-1952) saw Chinese troops fight US/UN forces for the control of Korea. In this historical background, both Japan and China would not like to see North-Korea become a nuclear power. Now China is a close ally of Pakistan and any kind of nuclear cooperation between North-Korea and Pakistan would not be tolerated by China. Thats why A.Q.Khan had to go. In reality, Dr A.Q.Khan was a scientist himself and Chief of the Pakistan's strategic intelligence ought to have warned him about the strong displeasure of China that would happen as a consequence.
[1] Atomic Bazaar, William Langewiesche, 2007.
[2] La Menace Nucléaire : 25 Questions Décisives, Bruno Tertrais, 2011.
[3] The China-Japan War, Vladimir, 1896.
[4] The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, Edited by John W.Steinberg, 2005.
[5] BBC Documentary: Nuclear Secrets, Part 5 of 5, Terror Trader.
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