Vindicating Mi-35 Hind Gunships of Indian Air Force

During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the performance of Mi-35 gunship helicopters (export versions of Mi-24) of the Indian Air Force was severely criticised by Indian Army. Air Force came up with many excuses but it was never fully exonerated.

Now the hot borders between India and Pakistan can possibly give a chance to vindicate (or re-vindicate) the name of Hind gunships and their crews. With timely intelligence and vigilance at borders, many planned attacks can be foiled or averted even before they are tried. But is it possible to succeed even when the plans have been compromised? It is this possibility that Indian military command is looking into.

Hind Gunship helicopters of IAF have been given the Mission 24 upgrade by IAI and they are now capable of low-level flying at night and also launching strikes at night. But the problem with helicopters is that they can't penetrate deep behind the border or LoC. Their slow speed means that their chances of escape and safe egress are not high.

An alternative is to use gunship helicopters only for destroying early warning radars of air defence and then follow the attack with strike fighters like the Su-30 Flanker. This obviously would be coordinated in time and space with air raid following shortly after the attack on the radar stations. With radars out of action, it would be very hard for PAF to see the situation in the air and guide its own planes for interception.

In this scenario, now there are two aspects. One, ensuring safety and survival of radars by either changing their position or replacing them with fake ones. It is possible that if the first phase is unsuccessful, the second phase might not follow at all.

With Mi-35 units based at Pathankot air base (according to order of battle), the likely theatre is again the LoC or its surroundings like the Working Boundary etc.

Deceptions of Brahmos Missile Design

The deception used with Brahmos Missile is in its air intake design. Public photos show a fixed intake cone (conical centrebody). Such a cone is technically called conical shock centrebody because it creates a conical shock wave in front of the missile at supersonic speeds. Unlike shown in the public photos, this nose cone has to be moveable (moving forward and backward at varying speeds). 

It is the same as used in Mig-21 fighter aircraft air intake or Mirage-III's half-cone air intakes. Both in Mig-21 and Mirage-III, these cones are moveable and not fixed. It has to be moveable in Brahmos missile too. The engine in Brahmos is a ramjet engine, it is not a scramjet engine. Ramjet engine uses subsonic combustion even at supersonic speeds. Shockwaves are used to slow down the air flow to the subsonic speed. 

Now this has other serious implications for the missile too. The radar seeker shown on the electronic media has to fit inside the moveable nose cone, which means a very reduced size for the antenna and a very complicated design which is highly unlikely for a missile. Such missiles (e.g., British Sea Dart) use semi-active radar guidance with antennas fitted to the nose of the missile or they are passive. This means that such missiles home in on the radio or radar emissions from the target themselves OR an external source of guidance is needed.

Kargil War and Takht-e-Sulaiman Peaks

Ever since Pakistan's military intervention in Kargil in 1999 and the ensuing diplomatic crisis with India, there is debate in Pakistan as to who is responsible for this crisis. PM Nawaz Sharif's view is that he was unaware and General Musharraf insists that the PM knew about it and that operation was a military success but perhaps a political and diplomatic failure. 

In short, Kargil has been made into a blame game between Gen Musharraf and PM Nawaz Sharif. The real pushers who relentlessly push everybody into doing something remain behind the scenes. 

These guys dont tell others the reason for their motivation and drive. The reasons can be completely outrageous like bringing in Pakistan's control the second Takht-e-Sulaiman which is near Srinagar. One Takht-e-Sulaiman (Solomon's Peak) is near DI Khan in Pakistan and these are the two solomon peaks in South Asia (others seem to be in Iran and Central Asia). 

It is a scared mountain which is revered by Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists alike. The hindus call it "Shankaracharya Hill" and they have built a temple on the top of it. This temple is protected by armed CFRP troops. The Mughal King Jehangir and his wife Noor Jehan are said to have climbed this hill together.

Challenges of Governing Tribal Areas : Fence And Strategy

The law and order situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan has drastically improved in the past few years, thanks to the persistent efforts of the state institutions, will of the local people and cooperation of the Afghan Govt. The challenge in such areas is always in maintaining peace and stability for a given period of time after having established it.

Prominent and experienced Afghan leader Ahmed Shah Masood realized in his later years that winning a battle is easier than bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan. This was undoubtedly one of his major disappointments in life (We hope that the current peace talks shall help realise this dream). 

In both Afghanistan and frontier regions of India, different rulers have tried different techniques, from utter barbarity to cunning deceptive schemes. Nobody has tried a wall and it would be a new experiment. Pakistan must explore or re-explore all options and strategies for governing its tribal areas.

The classic British approach in these areas was to give authority and ownership to local chiefs and help them maintain law and order through their local militias. The local chief would almost always be a person who had felt the grip of British power. These Chiefs were mentally and psychologically convinced of the overwhelming British power and hence would not dare rise against them.

Pressure tactics like using Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and financial blockades were tried in difficult circumstances. Another scheme which was almost permanent was that British would pay Afghanistan, who would then pay tribal chiefs. This way, the British would know who is receiving pay from Kabul. 

These cunning schemes would usually result in improved law and order. The British approach towards winning loyalty and making durable alliances in India was "loyalty in self-interest", "common enemy" and "prospects of better life through superior administration". Chiefs would collaborate with British authorities in self-interest. It remains to be determined as to what exactly are the interests of the tribals in areas like Waziristan. 

Is cross-border smuggling and drug trafficking included in their interests? Historically most rulers have given them the concession of cross-border trade, free electricity, no taxes etc. According to international media reports, the business of drugs in FATA continued uninterrupted under General Zia-Ul-Haq during the whole Soviet-Afghan War (1980-1988).

Now the "common enemy" approach. It happened in the Mogul era in India that many cities and large areas would become victim of robber assaults. The villagers and the Mogul kings would give the control of that city to the British in the hope that they would defeat the robbers. People would collaborate with the British because there was a common enemy to be defeated. Now we come to the superior administration aspect. It happened during several famines in India that people would look towards the British to get them out of the disastrous situations. They believed in the superior administration of the British.

For outright elimination of rebels in the frontier regions, British were helped by Mad Fakirs or ascetics who preached Jihad against the British. This way, the Govt would eliminate hundreds of rebels in a short time.

The task of controlling turbulent tribes is indeed difficult. The Moghul King of India, Aurangzeb Alamgir was given the same task by his father, Shah Jahan. Aurangzeb followed rigorous Islam whereas his father and elder brother had secular views. In 1647, Aurangzeb was sent to Afghanistan to prove his leadership and princely skills. He had to fight Uzbek, Hazara and other tribes and persians in Kandhar. Shah Jahan was perhaps sure that Aurangzeb would fail to subdue the turbulent tribes of Afghanistan. Nobody expected Aurangzeb to get out of the Afghan quagmire.

His approach was sheer demonstration of chivalry, spirituality and sacrificing the unimportant or untenable ground. During a battle with Uzbeks, right on the battlefield, he dismounted from his horse and started to offer his evening prayers. For his coolness under fire, he earned the respect of friends and foes alike. After campaigns in Afghanistan, Prince Aurangzeb was recognized as the coming man.

For further reading,

Rulers of India : Aurangzeb, Stanley Lane-Poole, Edited by W.W. Hunter, Oxford, 1901.