The 1971 India-Pakistan War : Betrayal or Blunders

If we study the military history of the India (Pre-1947), it would become evident that when faced with failure in war, we have always blamed betrayal and conspiracy instead of learning the right lessons. Be it the defeat of Siraj-Ud-dollah of Bengal (1757), the fall of Sultan Tipu (1799) or the Independence War (1857), we have always blamed triators instead of battleplans, strategy and bad Generalship. A good General should succeed in achieving his minimum objectives despite the risk of betrayal.

Agents, spies and informers are present on both sides and it is so since the time immemorial. From the engineering background, I would say that a General should have a "factor of safety" in his planning. Factor of safety is the extra protection against unforseen factors. To give an example, General Wellington can be quoted, who fought against the French Imperial Army during the Peninsular Wars (1807-1814). Despite the activity of embedded french informers, he succeeded in giving surprise to the French on several occasions.

Frequently-Mentioned Causes of Debacle

The insurgency of East Bengal (or East Pakistan) happened in early 1971. The counter-insurgency operation was launched in March 1971 by Lt General Raja Tikka Khan. Instead of overseeing the counter-insurgency to its end, he was posted to West Pakistan and replaced by Lt Gen Abdullah Khan Niazi. On his return to the West Pakistan, Lt Gen Raja Tikka Khan was given the command of the Pakistan Army's Strike Corps. The same Strike Corps that, according to many authors, did  not participate in the war. The GHQ command "Freeze Tikka" has become a historical phrase [1]. Several authors have pointed out that Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was not employed to its full potential [2][4] in the 1971 war. It has also been recorded by several authors that a high-level air surveillance radar of PAF was moved from the East to West Pakistan. 

Air surveillance radars are normally high-altitude ones, the low-level radars are special ones. What is never mentioned in this radar episode is that when this radar was transferred to West Pakistan? After the situation became hopeless or before the start of hostilities (22 Nov 1971)? (Edit: before the hostilities, as per Air Commodore (R) Kaiser Tufail). Additionally most authors claim that only one squadron of PAF fighters (F-86 Sabres) was deployed to the East Pakistan and that it was not sufficient to provide the needed air cover or air support.


Then there are views of the last Commander of the East Pakistan garrison, Lt General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi. Here is an excerpt of his interview[3]:

"After my return to Pakistan from Indian captivity in 1974, while preparing my report on the East Pakistan debacle, I heard persistent hints from GHQ sources that the Eastern Command had been sacrificed according to a detailed plan, and that its senior commanders were made the scapegoats for the loss of East Pakistan. My initial doubts turned into conviction when, over the years, I pondered over this episode and discussed it with people who knew that the GHQ Eastern Command had been deliberately cheated, tricked and misled as part of a grave conspiracy by the high command. In fact it was so obvious that even the Indian Major General Shah Beg Singh told me, "Your goose is cooked, Sir. They have decided to put the whole blame on you and your command for this episode." I am therefore convinced that the fall of East Pakistan was deliberately engineered".

I choose to ignore the abovementioned frequently-quoted causes for military defeat, i.e., Army Strike Corps not used, PAF support not fully available, air surveillance radar shifted to the west, only one PAF squadron deployed in the east and the engineered defeat theory as if these were not true. 

For counter-insurgency operations, army needed air support. It was absolutely inevitable to strengthen the air force contingent in the East. Thats why the air force contingent was now led by an ...... (Edit: Air Commodore) and the naval contingent led by a Rear Admiral. Rear Admiral is a two-star rank and Air Commodore is a single-star rank. How could the air force commander be junior to the naval commander? 

In reality, Pakistani military high command had strengthened the defence of the East Pakistan although the reinforcements arrived late. As compared to the figures of the 1965, the naval force was increased three times[6], the army strength was increased three times (three divisions)[1] and the air force strength should also have been tripled (Edit: officially the air force strength did not increase). Pakistan Navy also had deployed its Ghazi submarine to the eastern sector. In 1965, only one squadron of PAF (the No.14) was deployed there alongwith the No.14 Division of the Army and a few gunboats of the Navy. 

Communications between East and West Pakistan were vastly improved in early 1971 by the installation of the satellite communication stations with the help of RCA Canada[7]. Satellite communication in 1971 was a very modern method. The military command structure was also improved during the martial law administration and governership of Vice Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan who was posted there on 1st Sept 1969. A unified eastern command was created whose commander led all three services[6]. The plan therefore was to defend East Pakistan against all odds. Officers and soldiers fought with exceptional courage. This plan did not work out mainly because of a hostile local population and a clear military defeat in both Eastern and Western theaters of war. The Pakistani militay intelligence had completely underestimated the war fighting capability and military technology of India. The courage of officers and soldiers could not overcome the combination of  superior strategy and superior weapons. It was a military and technological defeat. Here we discuss only two aspects of technology and one aspect of the strategy.

Airborne Early Warning

Several authors ([4],[5]) and international aviation publications [8] have pointed out the inadequate air support given to Pakistan Army and Navy. The reason is not given. But an author [1] has pointed out the possible presence of Soviet Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft Tu-126 Moss to help the Indian Air Force. This might help to explain the reason of less-than-required air support. If Pakistan Air Force had itself suffered serious losses in the air war (due to AEW support to Indian Air Force), then it was obviously not in a position to provide sufficient air support to the Army and Navy. It is also noteworthy that Indian Air Force was much strict in awarding kills to its pilots in the 1971 War. This was perhaps meant to keep the AEW deployment secret. On Pakistani side, not being able to report the deployment of AEW was a grave intelligence failure. There are however unsettled details in this AEW episode, whether it was really Soviet? In reality it is unlikely that big Soviet AEW would come to India, where it can easily be spotted with its strange dome on the top. A single picture would be sufficient to betray its presence. It was neither Soviet nor that of USA. 

Long-Distance Communications

Just prior to the start of the 1971 War, Pakistan completed its satellite communication link between Eastern and Western Wings[7]. The dozens of books written on the 1971 War do not mention this satellite link. It was claimed by Lt Gen Abdullah Khan Niazi that he was ordered to surrender by GHQ Rawalpindi but GHQ did not honour him for obeying an order. Dozens of books were written on the 1971 Wars but none addresses the basic question that how the important orders were relayed to the Eastern Wing? The means available at that time were landline telephone, landline telegraph, satellite link, long-range radio or through an airborne messenger service flying between East and West Pakistan.

When the British consolidated their hold on India after the 1857 War, they laid a telegraph line all the way from England to India. Later, they also laid down a submarine telegraph line from India to England, thousands of miles long. Compared to the England-India distance, the Eastern and Western Wings of Pakistan were like next-door neighbours and laying a submarine communications cable should not have been a daunting task. Had Pakistan established a submarine communications cable with Eastern Wing? As usual , the books do not answer this. Secure, modern and sure means of communication imply that Lt Gen Abdullah Khan Niazi was ordered to surrender as he claimed himself to be the case.

Did Lt Gen Niazi surrender without a written or recorded order from GHQ? He should have thought that he might be asked to present proof of order, although it was the responsibility of the Army communication officers to convey a confirmed order to the commander. Better still, he could have asked Gen Yahya Khan to make an announcement on the Radio Pakistan and order him to surrender publically. It would have saved him from public disgrace later on.

International Alliances

The international alliances of India were superior to those of Pakistan. The important thing is that the allies of a country should in turn be allies among themselves. If allies of a country are not allies among themselves, then this does not constitute an effective and efficient alliance. India had alliances (or close ties) with Soviet Union and France and purchased its arms and supporting equipment from them. Now both France and Russia have historically been allies after the end of the Napoleonic wars (1815), despite the occurrence of the Crimean war (1850-1852).

France and Russia were allies in both World Wars. France was and is perhaps the only non-Warsaw pact western country to have a regular and strong Communist party. Therefore, the alliance chosen by India was perfect. In his book, "Lie Down With Lions", the author Ken Follet mentioned a doctor of the French Communist party who spied for the Soviet Union while treating patients in the Panjshir Valley of the Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1988). His primary objective was to provide intelligence for the capture of Ahmad Shah Masood. Although not a factual book, it is still relevant because author had received material from Pentagon for this book.

Infact, it was the responsibility of the heads of the strategic intelligence to guide the foreign policy of Pakistan. Untill the era of Ayub Khan (1958-1969),  Pakistan was a close ally of the USA. The close allies of USA are UK, Canada and Australia. Pakistan, therefore, joined the USA-UK-Canada-Australia axis. In the period of CENTO and SEATO, Pakistan purchased its arms from USA and UK. Pakistan got its first nuclear reactor from Canada, its first fighter jets (Supermarine Attacker) from UK and many other arms from USA.

After the 1965 War, Pakistan started to expel (or put out of business) the oil companies of the USA, reason being that they did not provide petroleum products during the war [9]. Pakistan then established its own national oil import and marketing company. Pakistan was not the first South Asian country to expel the US oil companies though. Sri Lanka did so in 1962 [10] and USA had threatened Sri Lanka with closure of its aid program. Sri Lanka was called Ceylon in those days.

India waited for a more opportune moment before expelling the US oil companies and did so after having won the 1971 War, getting a favourable agreement on Kashmir (the Shimla Agreement 1972/1974) and establishing itself as the premier military power in the South Asia.

In the aftermath of this oil companies episode, Pakistan did not receive much military aid from USA. General Yahya Khan subsequently turned towards Soviet Union, made several state visits and concluded an agreement for establishing a steel mill at Karachi. For weapons, Pakistan turned to France and China. It is evident that the alliances of Pakistan were not durable. These weak alliances manifested themselves in December 1971 when the Seventh Fleet of USA did not reach in time in the Bay of Bengal and China did not intervene in Pakistan's favor.

[1] Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan.

[2] Pak Fizaya ki Dastan-e-Shujaat (Urdu book), Inayat Ullah, Maktab-e-Dastan Publications, Lahore.

[3] Lt General (R) A.A.K. Niazi , The Rediff  Interview, http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/02inter1.htm

[4] The Figher Gap, Squadron Leader (R) Shuaib Alam Khan, May 1998, Defence Journal.

[5] Hamari Shikast ki Kahai (Urdu book), Inayat Ullah, Maktab-e-Dastan Publications, Lahore.

[6] Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan, Wikipedia.

[7] Special Trust and Confidence: Envoy essays in the Canadian diplomacy, David Reece, 1996.

[8] Flight International, 16 December 1971, pages 990-991.
[9http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/67/Pakistan-State-Oil-Company-Ltd.html
[10] The Kabul Times, 8 July 1962.