Failures of intelligence contributed in large part to the surrender of Pakistan's Military in Dec 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. From the chronology of the events, it would seem that there was an acute shortage of "strategic intelligence". Strategic intelligence would only focus on the bigger picture, the overall scenario. Intelligence failed in providing the high command with the real intentions of India, the imminence of a war and whether the decisive battles would be fought in the east or the west. The importance of strategic intelligence can be judged from the fact that force deployments are done based on it.
Here, however, we would consider a case of tactical intelligence failure (with strategic consequences in this case).
Destruction of runways at Tejgaon (Dhaka or Dacca) and Kurmitola Airfields:
These two airfields were constructed during the British period and used by the US Army Air Force (USAAF) in the Second World War (1939-1945). Four-engined heavy B-24 Liberator and B-25 Mitchell bombers used these airfields for bombing missions in Burma and Thailand [1]. To say that kurmitola was under construction in Dec 1971 and therefore unusable (according to some authors) is not understandable.
Official sources mention that runway of Tezgaon or Tejgaon airfield was disabled on 6th December 1971. Ironically, three RAF (Royal Air Force) C-130 Hercules landed on the same damaged runway a few days later (on 12th Dec 1971) and then took-off heavily-laden with with British nationals. The runway was cleared around in one hour for the C-130s. A truce of a few hours was observed by the Indian Air Force (IAF) for the evacuation of the British nationals. Here is an excerpt from the article[2];
"Wing Commander Ken Hannah, who has
died aged 85, led a daring operation by three RAF Hercules transport
aircraft into Dacca during an armed revolt in East Pakistan, rescuing
more than 400 people.Conflict had broken out in March
1971 when West Pakistan attempted to crush separatists in East
Pakistan, who had the support of India. Nine months later the West
Pakistani forces in the East surrendered to the Indian Army and the
separatists, leading to the creation of the independent Bangladesh.
When West Pakistan was close to
defeat, a short truce was called to allow refugees to be rescued, and on
December 12, Hannah — who was CO of No 47 Squadron, based with three
Hercules aircraft at Calcutta — arrived over Dacca. For an hour he circled the
airfield, waiting for debris to be removed from the runway, which was
also pitted with bomb craters. Finally he decided that a landing was
feasible, and ordered the other two aircraft to follow him in if he was
successful. The three Hercules landed safely
and picked up the waiting civilians. With no time to make detailed
calculations, Hannah had to estimate the runway length required for the
heavily laden aircraft, and briefed his fellow pilots accordingly .
Having arrived back at Calcutta,
Hannah learned that there were more civilians still stranded at Dacca.
With only a few hours of the truce remaining, he immediately returned
alone to evacuate them. He took off from Dacca within minutes of the end
of the truce".
The important question is that how the runway was damaged in the first place?
To the air force personnel (including intelligence) of the PAF, it seemed that the runways were badly damaged by IAF planes carrying special anti-runway munitions. Anti-runway penetration weapons were not widely in service around the world at that time (1971), although experimental versions might have existed. The bunker-buster bombs were present even in the Second World War (1939-1945) like the RAF Tall-Boy and Grand Slam (22000 lbs) bombs but these were not penetration type weapons for carriage by fighters. Only heavy bombers carried those bombs. Furthermore, for any penetration, they depended upon their sheer weight itself when dropped from at least 20000 feet. Penetration (especially from low altitude) needs dual warheads. The first charge makes a hole in the target and the second warhead explodes inside the target with devastating effects.
Matra (Now MBDA) Durandal runway denial weapon put into service in 1977. Used by USAF as BLU-107.
Matra (Now MBDA) BAP-100 in early 1980s.
JP233 (designed for Panavia Tornado, well later than 1971)
MW-1 (designed for Panavia Tornado, well later than 1971)
IAF was more likely to use Soviet weapons but it is highly unlikely that Soviet Union put into service an anti-runway weapon several years ahead of the west. What can be any other scenario leading to the disabling of the runways?
Intelligence surely failed in finding out the plans and arrangements done for destroying runways at Tejgaon and Kurmitola. It must have been done through first digging a tunnel under those runways and then packing it with explosives. The runways were blown inside out. The explosives must have been placed in a mine under an important stretch of runway. All this went unnoticed by the military intelligence of Pakistan. Runways should have been monitored for underground digging and mining through the use of geophones and other listening devices. The blowing of runways was synchronised with an air raid of Indian Air Force so that nobody would ever doubt a mining operation.
Escape of Aircrafts to Tibet:
When
the India banned/stopped the overflights, the Pakistani aeroplanes had
to fly around the Indian peninsula (over Sri Lanka) and then from Bay
of Bengal to the East Pakistan. An easy and short route was to fly over
Tibet (China) starting from Kashmir and then to East Pakistan via
Nepal, although it involved a 23 km stretch of flying over India.
Overflying a 23 km stretch of land hardly takes more than a few seconds
and during a declared war, there is no violation of airspace.
Reinforcements from the western wing could have reached the eastern wing
using the same route. Given the friendly relations between Pakistan and
China, this arrangeemnt could have been made.
At
the end of hostilies or even before the end, the aviation assets of
Pakistani military started fleeing to Burma (now Myanmar). Officially,
these aircraft did not include fighter jets of the Pakistan Air Force.
What is amazing is that PAF fighter jets could have made it to the
nearby Tibet (China), provided they had attempted a take-off from a nearby straight stretch of road or using PSP (Perforated Steel Planks). East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) is separated from the Nepal border by a
stretch of only 23 km [3] at the narrowest point. Then the width of Nepal at that point is around
127 km. Therefore to reach Tibet, PAF fighters only needed to overfly
23 km of hostile Indian airspace, 127 km of the neutral Nepalese airspace and then land in any of the airstrips in Tibet.
China
had already constructed several airfields in Tibet prior to sending
troops there in early 1950s and then prior to the 1962 Indo-Chinese
war. The fighter jets of Iraqi Air Force flew to Iran during the 1st
Gulf War (1991) and the runways of Iraqi Air Force were also heavily
damaged with dedicated anti-runway munitions and precision-guided weaponry
by the US-led Coalition.
Self-Reliant Air Bases / Command and Control Centers
Damage to runway is not the only thing that would hamper or hinder the operations of an Air Force or military aviation in general. Communications, power supply etc are also vital.
Attack on power generation units or power stations or even dams or grid stations is a very likely scenario in a war. It has happened in almost all wars from the famous RAF "DAM BUSTER" raids on Germany of WW2 to attack on Iraqi power stations in 1st Gulf war (1991).
The question that comes to mind in this scenario is "Are our air defence command centers dependent on external electric power supply?" or they have their own power supply as backup? The same applies to vital components of air bases like power supplies to aircraft shelters and technical/repair units of air base. Do they have independent/backup electric power generation system? If there is no redundant/backup power supply system, our operations may come to a virtual halt in the event of power disconnection.
[1] 7th Bombardment Group/Wing 1918-1995, Robert F. Dorr
[2]http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.fr/2011/12/wing-commander-ken-hannah-raf-led.html
[3] Distances measured on google maps.
[1] 7th Bombardment Group/Wing 1918-1995, Robert F. Dorr
[2]http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.fr/2011/12/wing-commander-ken-hannah-raf-led.html
[3] Distances measured on google maps.
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